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TRIPS, EBAY, AND DENIALS OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF:  
IS ARTICLE 31 COMPLIANCE EVERYTHING? 
 
 
Andrew C. Mace1 
 
In eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the Supreme Court held 
that decisions to grant injunctive relief must accord with the traditional 
principles of equity, thereby invalidating the practice of generally granting 
 permanent injunctions to patentees upon finding infringement. Under 
eBay, denials of permanent injunctive relief might become more common, 
as courts instead opt to award an ongoing royalty. Because TRIPS 
contains provisions—primarily Article 31—that specify the conditions 
under which compulsory licenses for patents may be granted, an increase 
in denials of injunctive relief in favor of an ongoing royalty (creating, in 
essence, a compulsory license) in the U.S. requires review as to whether 
the U.S. is out of compliance with these provisions. This Note 1) examines 
the primary provisions relating to compulsory licensing in TRIPS; 2) 
studies differences of opinion regarding the nature of compulsory licenses 
and which understanding is appropriate for TRIPS based on a review of 
the Agreement‘s text and drafting history, historical practices, and policy; 
3) examines eBay and subsequent cases denying permanent injunctive 
relief; 4) analyzes where eBay and TRIPS may conflict and attempts to 
resolve the differences; and 5) suggests strategies that U.S. courts might 
adopt to be TRIPS compliant with respect to compulsory licensing. This 
Note concludes that the U.S. faces a dilemma irrespective of Article 31‘s 
ultimate interpretation: if eBay is TRIPS compliant, developing countries 
can cite the case as precedent for implementing their own compulsory 
licensing systems with their own notions of equity and the public interest; 
if eBay is not TRIPS compliant, the U.S. may be brought before the 
TRIPS Dispute Settlement Body, the result of which would be a loosening 
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of TRIPS compulsory licensing requirements or a re-tightening of the U.S. 
patent law injunctive relief. Absent a Dispute Settlement Body panel 
report interpreting Article 31, the WTO should issue a ministerial 
declaration to clarify the meaning and scope of Article 31 as it did for 
public health in the Doha Declaration. 
 






Prior to the Supreme Court‘s 2006 ruling in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,2 
courts generally granted permanent injunctions to patentees upon finding infringement 
absent exceptional circumstances.3 In eBay, the Supreme Court stated that such 
categorical grants of injunctive relief lacked statutory support and held that decisions to 
grant such relief must accord with the traditional principles of equity. 4 One conclusion to 
draw from eBay is that denials of requests for permanent injunctive relief will become 
more common, and courts instead will opt to award an ongoing royalty. Cases such as 
eBay on remand5 and Amado v. Microsoft Corporation6 illustrate that the conclusion is 
not speculative. 
In 1994, the U.S. joined the World Trade Organization (―WTO‖).7 Article II 
section 2 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization binds 
all WTO members to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights8 (―TRIPS‖ or ―Agreement‖). Because TRIPS contains provisions specifying the 
conditions under which compulsory licenses for patents may be granted, an increase in 
denials of injunctive relief in favor of an ongoing royalty (creating, in essence, a 
compulsory license) in the U.S. requires review as to whether the U.S. is out of 
compliance with these provisions. 
Some may argue that noncompliance is nothing to worry about. TRIPS is not self-
executing9 and is instead merely a covenant among participating members to bring their 
                                                 
2 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
3 Andrei Iancu & W. Joss Nichols, Balancing the Four Factors in Permanent Injunction 
Decisions: A Review of post-eBay Case Law, 89 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc‘y 395, 395 (May 
2007). 
4 EBay, 547 U.S. at 394. 
5 MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556 (E.D. Va. 2007) (dissolving 
permanent injunction order in favor of an ongoing royalty). 
6 Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 517 F.3d 1353, 1361 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 26, 2008) (concluding that 
the district court‘s dissolution of its pre-eBay permanent injunction order in light of eBay was 
within its discretion). 
7 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1, Legal 
Instruments – Results of the Uruguay Round, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994). 
8 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) 
[hereinafter TRIPS or Agreement]. 
9 See, e.g., Jay Dratler & Stephen M. McJohn, Intellectual Property Law: Commercial, 
Creative, and Industrial Property § 1A.01, at 1A-6 (2007) (stating that TRIPS is not self-
executing); Harold C. Wegner, Injunctive Relief: A Charming Betsy Boomerang, 4 Nw. J. Tech. 
& Intell. Prop. 156, 166 (Spring 2006) (stating that TRIPS is not self-executing). 




laws into compliance with its terms.10 Moreover, in the U.S., the legislation 
implementing TRIPS is structured to disclaim any direct effect of the Agreement. 11  
However, there are two reasons why the U.S. is not free to pursue patent law 
policies unfettered by its obligations in TRIPS. First, TRIPS, unlike previous intellectual 
property agreements which were ―toothless and largely ignored by the patent 
community,‖12 contains a mandatory dispute resolution provision.13 As a result, ―[a]ny 
contracting state that fails fully to comply, as determined by a dispute-resolution panel, 
may find itself the object of calibrated and judicially sanctioned trade retaliation on the 
part of its trading partners.‖14 Second, and more important, U.S. noncompliance may 
encourage other nations to follow suit.15 Noncompliance risks undermining the very 
policy of strong international intellectual property rights and enforcement the U.S. sought 
during TRIPS negotiations.16 Thus, it is important that U.S. law comply with TRIPS, 
resolving any tension that may exist. Accordingly, this Note will examine whether eBay 
and subsequent cases denying permanent injunctive relief violate TRIPS and, if so, what 
steps might be taken to bring the U.S. into compliance.  
Part II of this Note examines the primary provisions relating to compulsory 
licensing in TRIPS. Part III studies differences of opinion regarding the nature of 
compulsory licenses and which understanding is appropriate for TRIPS. Part IV examines 
eBay and subsequent cases denying permanent injunctive relief. Part V analyzes where 
eBay and TRIPS may conflict and attempts to resolve the differences. Part VI suggests 






                                                 
10 Dratler & McJohn, supra note 9, § 1A.01, at 1A-6. 
11 See id. § 1A.04, at 1A-25 (noting that the implementing legislation, the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act, makes three points: 1) It decrees that the ―law of the United States‖ prevails 
over anything in the Uruguay Round Agreements (―URA‖) in the event of any inconsistencies; 2) 
It disclaims any intent to modify any other law of the US; and 3) It explicitly precludes any 
private or state cause of action or defense being based upon the URA.). See generally Uruguay 
Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 102, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994). 
12 Wegner, supra note 9, at 170. 
13 TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 64. 
14 Dratler & McJohn, supra note 9, § 1A.01, at 1A-7. 
15 See Wegner, supra note 9, at 170; Charlene A. Stern-Dombal, Note, Tripping Over TRIPS: 
Is Compulsory Licensing Under eBay at Odds with U.S. Statutory Requirements and TRIPS? 41 
Suffolk U. L. Rev. 249, 275 (2007). 
16 See, e.g., Wegner, supra note 9, at 163 (stating that the United States drew up the ―tightest 
possible rules against compulsory licensing that could be imagined at the time‖). 




II. COMPULSORY LICENSING PROVISIONS IN TRIPS 
 
To examine how current U.S. law post-eBay might conflict with TRIPS, it is first 
necessary to identify and understand the relevant TRIPS provisions. This is not easy 
because the language of the Agreement is often broad and vague, and the few official 
interpretations rendered by the TRIPS Dispute Settlement Body do not address 
compulsory licensing.17  
 
 
A. The Guiding Principles 
 
Under TRIPS, a patent confers the exclusive rights to make, use, offer for sale, 
sell, and import an invention.18 Any limitation on these exclusive rights operates against 
the backdrop of the entire Agreement, meaning that the objectives19 and principles20 of 
                                                 
17 See U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev. & the Int‘l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev. 
(UNCTAD-ICTSD), Resource Book on TRIPS and Development 480 (2005) [hereinafter 
Resource Book] (―As of [2005], there are no decisions of a WTO dispute settlement panel or the 
Appellate Body that directly interpret Article 31.‖); see also World Trade Organization, Dispute 
Settlement – Chronological List of Disputes Cases, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2008); 
World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement – Appellate Body Reports, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab_reports_e.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2008). 
18 TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 28. 
19 Id. art. 7. TRIPS article 7 (―Objectives‖) reads: 
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should 
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and 
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of 
technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic 
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations. 
20 Id. art. 8. TRIPS article 8 (―Principles‖) reads:  
1. Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, 
adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote 
the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and 
technological development, provided that such measures are consistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement.  
2. Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the provisions 
of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property 
rights by right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade 
or adversely affect the international transfer of technology. 




the Agreement must not be disserved and the limitation must be non-discriminatory. 21 
Accordingly, rights may be limited where the goal is to promote the public interest and 
protect public health and nutrition,22 but a limitation that discriminates as to ―the place of 
invention, the field of technology [or] whether products are imported or locally 
produced‖23 is impermissible. Additionally, the enforcement of patent rights should be 
done only in a manner ―conducive to social and economic welfare‖ and should balance a 
patent holder‘s ―rights and obligations.‖24 Thus, the public interest and notions of fairness 
should be guiding factors in deciding whether enforcement of rights or any limitation 
thereof is ultimately appropriate. 
 
 
B. The Primary Compulsory Licensing Provisions 
 
Articles 30 and 31 of TRIPS and Article 5A of the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property (―Paris Convention‖), which is incorporated by 
reference into the Agreement,25 outline limitations on the exclusive rights a patent 
confers. Article 30, entitled ―Exceptions to Rights Conferred,‖ states:  
 
Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred 
by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict 
with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice 
the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the 
legitimate interests of third parties.26 
 
Article 30 is generally considered to include activities such as acts done privately and for 
non-commercial purposes and acts done for experimental purposes;27 the W/76 draft of 
Article 30 in the TRIPS Agreement explicitly states as much: 
                                                 
21 Id. art. 27.1 (―[P]atent rights [shall be] enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of 
invention, the field of technology and whether the products are imported or locally produced.‖).  
22 Id. art. 8. 
23 Id. art. 27.1. 
24 Id. art. 7. 
25 Id. art. 2.1 (―In respect of Parts II, III, and IV of this Agreement, Members shall comply 
with Articles 1 through 12, and Article 19, of the Paris Convention (1967).‖).  
26 Id. art. 30. 
27 See Intellectual Property and International Trade: The TRIPS Agreement 208-10 (Carlos M. 
Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 1st ed. 1998) [hereinafter Correa & Yusuf]. But see Michael 
Halewood, Regulating Patent Holders: Local Working Requirements and Compulsory Licences 
at International Law, 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 243, 269 (Summer 1997) (concluding that TRIPS 
Article 30 extends to compulsory licensing for non-working and other patentee abuses). 





2.2 [Provided that legitimate interests of the proprietor of the patent 
and of third parties are taken into account,] limited exceptions to the 
exclusive rights conferred by a patent may be made for certain acts, such 
as:  
2.2.1 Rights based on prior use.  
2.2.2 Acts done privately and for non-commercial purposes.  
2.2.3 Acts done for experimental purposes.  
2.2.4 Preparation in a pharmacy in individual cases of a medicine in 
accordance with a prescription, or acts carried out with a medicine so 
prepared.  
2.2.5A Acts done in reliance upon them not being prohibited by a valid 
claim present in a patent as initially granted, but subsequently becoming 
prohibited by a valid claim of that patent changed in accordance with 
procedures for effecting changes to patents after grant.  
2.2.6B Acts done by government for purposes merely of its own use.28  
 
Because no record was made of the informal sessions during which the Chairman‘s text 
was revised,29 it is unclear why the more succinct version was ultimately chosen. Since 
the scope of use contemplated in this Note exceeds the exceptions available in Article 30, 
the present analysis does not consider Article 30.30 
Article 31, entitled ―Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder,‖ 
addresses unauthorized use other than that allowed under Article 30, and  speaks to the 
heart of the compulsory license issue.31 Article 31 states: 
 
Where the law of a Member allows for other use of the subject matter of a 
patent without the authorization of the right holder, including use by the 
government or third parties authorized by the government, the following 
provisions shall be respected: 
  
(a) authorization of such use shall be considered on its individual merits;  
  
(b) such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user 
                                                 
28 GATT Chairman, Status of Work in the Negotiating Group – Chairman’s Report to the 
GNG, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/76, § 5 ¶ 2.2 (Jul. 23, 1990). 
29 Daniel Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis ix (1st ed. 1998).  
30 See Panel Report, Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R 
(Mar. 17, 2000) (In a complaint before the TRIPS Dispute Settlement Body (―DSB‖), providing 
an interpretation of article 30, the European Communities claimed that Canada‘s domestic 
pharmaceutical stockpiling and regulatory review exceptions to exclusive patent rights exceeded 
Article 30‘s scope. The DSB construed at length the language of Article 30).  
31 TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 30, n.7 (―‗Other use‘ refers to use other than that allowed under 
Article 30.‖). 




has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on 
reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have not 
been successful within a reasonable period of time. This requirement may 
be waived by a Member in the case of a national emergency or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial 
use. In situations of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme 
urgency, the right holder shall, nevertheless, be notified as soon as 
reasonably practicable. In the case of public non-commercial use, where 
the government or contractor, without making a patent search, knows or 
has demonstrable grounds to know that a valid patent is or will be used by 
or for the government, the right holder shall be informed promptly; 
  
(c) the scope and duration of such use shall be limited to the purpose for 
which it was authorized, and in the case of semi-conductor technology 
shall only be for public non-commercial use or to remedy a practice 
determined after judicial or administrative process to be anti-competitive; 
  
(d) such use shall be non-exclusive; 
  
(e) such use shall be non-assignable, except with that part of the enterprise 
or goodwill which enjoys such use; 
  
(f) any such use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the 
domestic market of the Member authorizing such use; 
  
(g) authorization for such use shall be liable, subject to adequate 
protection of the legitimate interests of the persons so authorized, to be 
terminated if and when the circumstances which led to it cease to exist and 
are unlikely to recur. The competent authority shall have the authority to 
review, upon motivated request, the continued existence of these 
circumstances; 
  
(h) the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the 
circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value of the 
authorization; 
  
(i) the legal validity of any decision relating to the authorization of such 
use shall be subject to judicial review or other independent review by a 
distinct higher authority in that Member; 
  
(j) any decision relating to the remuneration provided in respect of such 
use shall be subject to judicial review or other independent review by a 
distinct higher authority in that Member; 
  
(k) Members are not obliged to apply the conditions set forth in 
subparagraphs (b) and (f) where such use is permitted to remedy a practice 




determined after judicial or administrative process to be anti-competitive. 
The need to correct anti-competitive practices may be taken into account 
in determining the amount of remuneration in such cases. Competent 
authorities shall have the authority to refuse termination of authorization if 
and when the conditions which led to such authorization are likely to 
recur; 
  
(l) where such use is authorized to permit the exploitation of a patent (―the 
second patent‖) which cannot be exploited without infringing another 
patent (―the first patent‖), the following additional conditions shall apply:  
  
(i) the invention claimed in the second patent shall involve an 
important technical advance of considerable economic significance 
in relation to the invention claimed in the first patent; 
  
(ii) the owner of the first patent shall be entitled to a cross-licence 
on reasonable terms to use the invention claimed in the second 
patent; and 
  
(iii) the use authorized in respect of the first patent shall be non-
assignable except with the assignment of the second patent. 32 
 
Article 31 is commonly referred to as a compulsory licensing provision33 and 
together with Article 5A of the Paris Convention34 (―Article 5A‖) prescribes grounds and 
                                                 
32 TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 31. 
33 See, e.g., Correa & Yusuf, supra note 27, at 208; Gervais, supra note 29, at 165; World 
Trade Organization, Intellectual property (TRIPS) – Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/tripfq _e.htm#CompulsoryLicensing (last visited 
Dec. 1, 2008) (―Article 31 allows compulsory licensing and government use of a patent without 
the authorization of its owner.‖). 
34 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 5A, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (1883) 
[hereinafter Paris Convention].  Article 5A reads: 
(1) Importation by the patentee into the country where the patent has been granted of articles 
manufactured in any of the countries of the Union shall not entail forfeiture of the patent.  
(2) Each country of the Union shall have the right to take legislative measures providing for 
the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the abuses which might result from the exercise of the 
exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for example, failure to work.  
(3) Forfeiture of the patent shall not be provided for except in cases where the grant of 
compulsory licenses would not have been sufficient to prevent the said abuses. No proceedings  
for the forfeiture or revocation of a patent may be instituted before the expiration of two years 
from the grant of the first compulsory license.  




minimum conditions on which use without the authorization of the right holder may be 
permitted. While Article 31 states grounds on which a compulsory license is permissible, 
the list is not exhaustive; a government may authorize compulsory licenses on other 
grounds, provided the conditions set forth in Article 31 are observed and the Agreement‘s 
overarching principles are satisfied.35 This is affirmed36 in the 2001 Doha Declaration on 
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (―Doha Declaration‖) which states that ―[e]ach 
member has the right to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to determine the 
grounds upon which such licences are granted.‖37  
Thus, in short, to comply with Article 31, a law permitting unauthorized use of a  
patent requires 1) consideration on the individual merits of the use, 38 2) prior negotiation 
between the parties,39 3) use limited in scope and duration,40 4) use non-exclusive41 and 
                                                                                                                                                 
(4) A compulsory license may not be applied for on the ground of failure to 
work or insufficient working before the expiration of a period of four years from 
the date of filing of the patent application or three years from the date of the grant 
of the patent, whichever period expires last; it shall be refused if the patentee 
justifies his inaction by legitimate reasons. Such a  
compulsory license shall be non–exclusive and shall not be transferable, even 
in the form of the grant of a sub-license, except with that part of the enterprise or 
goodwill which exploits such license.  
(5) The foregoing provisions shall be applicable, mutatis mutandis, to utility 
models.  
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 5A, Mar. 20, 1883, 828 U.N.T.S. 
305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].  
35 See, e.g., Stern-Dombal, supra note 15, at 273 (stating that WTO members are free to 
determine grounds on which to grant compulsory licenses).  
36 See World Trade Organization, Intellectual Property (TRIPS) – TRIPS and Public Health: 
Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals and TRIPS, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_faq_e.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2008) 
(―The TRIPS Agreement does not specifically list the reasons that might be used to justify 
compulsory licensing. However, the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health confirms that 
countries are free to determine the grounds for granting compulsory licences.‖).  
37 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declarat ion on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755, ¶ 5(b) (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].  
38 TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 31(a). Note that this formulation is different than case-by-case 
review. See also Stern-Dombal, supra note 15, at 274 n.211 (citing Jayashree Watal, Intellectual 
Property Rights in the WTO and Developing Countries 2-3 (2001)).  
39 TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 31(b). 
40 Id. art. 31(c). 




non-assignable,42 5) use primarily limited to supplying the domestic market, 43 6) 
adequate remuneration for the right holder,44 and 7) judicial review of decisions.45 If the 
use is authorized on grounds of national emergency, other extreme urgency, or public 
non-commercial (i.e., government) use, the prior negotiation requirement is waived. 
Similarly, if the use is granted to remedy anti-competitive practices, the prior negotiation 
and domestic market requirements are waived.46 However, if the use is granted because 
the patent holder failed to use his invention, Article 5A(4) provides an additional 
requirement: a license to use the invention cannot be applied for before the expiration of 
four years from patent application filing or three years from issue, whichever is later.47 
Moreover, if the patent holder can ―justif[y] his inaction by legitimate reasons,‖ the 
license must be refused.48 A diagram for determining Article-31-compliant authorization 
is provided in Appendix I.49 
The language of Article 31 itself and Article 31‘s place with respect to the entire 
Agreement are subject to various interpretations. First, Article 31 may be the ultimate 
arbiter of all unauthorized use beyond Article 30. That is, Article 31 categorically 
controls all unauthorized use other than that allowed under Article 30, and any outcome 
determined by Article 31 is per se compliant with TRIPS. The European Communities 
suggested a similar interpretation of Article 30 in Canada-Patent Protection of 
Pharmaceutical Products.50 Under a second interpretation, Article 31 may control 
                                                                                                                                                 
41 Id. art. 31(d). 
42 Id. art. 31(e). 
43 Id. art. 31(f). 
44 Id. art. 31(h). 
45 Id. art. 31(i). 
46 Id. art. 31(k). 
47 Paris Convention, supra note 34, art. 5A(4); see also Georg H.C. Bodenhausen, Guide to the 
Application of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property as Revised at 
Stockholm in 1967 at 71 (BIRPI 1968) (stating that paragraph (4) of Article 5A applies only to 
compulsory licenses on the ground of failure to work or insufficient working).  
48 Paris Convention, supra note 34, art. 5A(4). 
49 Appendix I, infra p. 38. 
50 The Dispute Settlement Body noted: 
 [I]n the view of the [European Communities (―EC‖)], Articles 7 and 8 
are statements that describe the balancing of goals that had already taken place in 
negotiating the final texts of the TRIPS Agreement.  According to the EC, to 
view Article 30 as an authorization for governments to ―renegotiate‖ the overall 




unauthorized use subject to consistency with other TRIPS provisions. Finally, Article 
31—irrespective of any constraints other provisions impose—may simply not cover all 
unauthorized use, including judicial denials of permanent injunctive relief. Under this 
third interpretation, courts would have far more discretion in crafting an equitable remedy 
for infringement. In evaluating these options, drafting history, intratextual analysis, and 
history provide some cues. Because the Paris Convention51 and the drafting history of 
Article 3152 use the term ―compulsory license,‖ it may be helpful to start the analysis by 
considering what a compulsory license is.  
 
 
III. WHAT IS A COMPULSORY LICENSE? 
 
 By way of background, a compulsory license is also known as a non-voluntary 
license.53 Black’s Law Dictionary defines a ―compulsory license‖ as it pertains to patents 
as ―[a] statutorily created license that allows certain people to pay a royalty and use an 
invention without the patentee‘s permission.‖54 Under Black’s definition, the operative 
word is ―statutorily.‖ Black’s notes that the U.S. does not have a compulsory licensing 
system for patents,55 but § 115 of the Copyright Act56 is a perfect example that meets the 
                                                                                                                                                 
balance of the Agreement would involve a double counting of such socio-
economic policies.  
Panel Report, Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R at 154 (Mar. 
17, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/7428d.pdf. 
51 Paris Convention, supra note 4, art. 5A (Article 5A of the Paris Convention is incorporated 
by reference into TRIPS. TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 2. Paris Article 5A(2) states ―Each country of 
the Union shall have the right to take legislative measures providing for the grant of compulsory 
licenses to prevent the abuses which might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights 
conferred by the patent, for example, failure to work.‖). 
52 See, e.g., GATT Secretariat, Status of Work in the Negotiating Group – Chairman’s Report 
to the GNG, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/76, Part III § 5 (Jul. 23, 1990), available at 
http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92110034.pdf (Paragraph 5A.1 reads, ―The term 
‗compulsory license‘ shall be understood to cover licenses of right [and government use without 
the authorization of the patent owner]. PARTIES shall minimize the grant of compulsory licences 
in order not to impede adequate protection of patent rights.‖). 
53 Gervais, supra note 29, at 164. 
54 Black‘s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). This definition of ―compulsory license‖ includes 
―licenses of right,‖ where anyone may use an invention in return for a license fee. See also Org. 
Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Econ. Analysis & Statistics Div., Directorate for Sci., Tech. & 
Indus., Glossary of Patent Terminology (2006), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/39/37569498.pdf 
. 
55 Black‘s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) (―While some nations currently recognize 
compulsory licenses, the United States never has.‖). 




requirements set forth in Black’s to be a compulsory licensing provision: statutory 
creation and use without authorization from the right holder.57 The ―certain people‖ 
language in the definition also suggests that a license is not limited to a single individual 
or party (as would typically be the case when a court imposes an ongoing royalty in lieu 
of a permanent injunction), but rather, available to anyone who meets the criteria set forth 
in the licensing statute.  
 A recent U.S. Federal Circuit decision supports this view. In Paice, L.L.C. v. 
Toyota Motor Corporation,58 Judge Prost noted: 
 
We use the term ongoing royalty to distinguish this equitable remedy from 
a compulsory license. The term ―compulsory license‖ implies that anyone 
who meets certain criteria has congressional authority to use that which is 
licensed. . . . By contrast, the ongoing-royalty order at issue here is limited 
to one particular set of defendants; there is no implied authority in the 
court‘s order for any other auto manufacturer to follow in Toyota‘s 
footsteps and use the patented invention with the court‘s imprimatur. 59  
 
Thus, a judicial denial of permanent injunctive relief would not constitute a 
compulsory license under this definition. The fifty-two intellectual property professors 
who filed amici curiae briefs60 in support of eBay agreed with this distinction:  
 
[A] judicial refusal to grant injunctive relief when equity does not support 
it is not the same as a compulsory license imposed by a legislature. A 
compulsory license is a blanket rule that permits all others to use a patent 
upon payment of a specified royalty, giving certainty to those who would 
infringe the patent that they can do so upon payment of a royalty. Equity, 
by contrast, considers the harms and benefits of an injunction to the parties 
and to the public in the context of a particular case with a particular 
evidentiary record.61 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
56 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2007).  
57 The definition of compulsory license as it pertains to copyright is similar to the definition 
for patents, except that it refers to use of copyrighted material instead of use of an invention.  
58 Paice, L.L.C. v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293 (2007). 
59 Id. at 1313 n.13 (citation omitted).  
60 Brief Amici Curiae of 52 Intellectual Property Professors in Support of Petitioners, eBay 
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-130), 2005 U.S. Briefs 130 (among 
the professors on the brief were Rochelle C. Dreyfuss of N.Y.U., Peter W. Martin of Cornell, and 
Robert P. Merges of U.C. Berkeley. Id. at appendix).  
61 Id. at 9. 




However, the WTO website defines a compulsory license as ―authorization, given 
by a government, to use a patented invention without the consent of the patent-holder.‖62 
This definition is broader because it lacks the statutory creation and criteria elements.63 
Though not an official definition, other commentators define the term similarly, 
suggesting that this broader definition is the more commonly understood one. 64 Under 
this definition, a judicial denial of injunctive relief would be a compulsory license. In 
Paice, Judge Rader adopted this definition, disagreeing with Judge Prost‘s interpretation 
and writing, ―calling a compulsory license an ‗ongoing royalty‘ does not make it any less 
a compulsory license.‖65 
 
 
A. Which Definition is Intended in TRIPS? 
 
One could attempt to circumvent this question by asserting that judicial 
compulsory licenses are statutorily based because § 283 of the Patent Act grants equitable 
discretion to courts when fashioning a remedy.66 There are three reasons this fails. The 
first two relate to the idea that a compulsory licensing system is as much about its 
provisions as its statutory basis. First, § 283 relief applies only to the parties in a 
particular infringement proceeding; it does not provide a remedy generally available to 
any party. Second, arguably, a statutory licensing scheme envisions more than the mere 
                                                 
62 World Trade Organization, Intellectual property (TRIPS) – Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/tripfq_e.htm#CompulsoryLicensing (last visited 
Mar. 18, 2008). 
63 It is also narrower in a sense because it does not require a royalty payment. However, the 
two definitions offered will be hereinafter referred to as ―narrow‖ and ―broad.‖  
64 See Jerome H. Reichman & Catherine Hasenzahl, Comment, Non-voluntary Licensing of 
Patented Inventions: History, TRIPs, and Canadian and United States Practice, 6 Bridges 
Between Trade and Sustainable Dev. 7 , Oct. 2002, at 3, 3, available at 
http://www.iprsonline.org/ictsd/docs/ReichmanBridgesYear6N7Oct2002.pdf (defining 
compulsory license as ―the practice by a government to authorize itself or third parties to use the 
subject matter of a patent without the authorization of the right holder for reasons of public 
policy.‖); Carlos M. Correa, Intellectual Property Rights and the Use of Compulsory Licenses: 
Options for Developing Countries 3 (South Ctr., Trade-Related Agenda, Dev. & Equity 
(T.R.A.D.E.) Working Papers No. 5, 1999), available at 
http://www.southcentre.org/publications/workingpapers/wp05.pdf (defining compulsory license 
as ―authorization given by a national authority to a person, without or against the consent of the 
title-holder, for the exploitation of a subject matter protected by a patent or other intellectual 
property rights.‖ (footnote omitted)). 
65 Paice, L.L.C. v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1136 (2007) (Rader, J., concurring). 
66 See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006).  




grant of discretion—something along the lines of 17 U.S.C. § 115,67 which sets out 
criteria and conditions for the grant of compulsory licenses. Finally, comme ntators agree 
that the Patent Act does not contain a statutory compulsory licensing provision, which 
forecloses the possibility that § 283 is such a provision. 68 Thus, it is necessary to 
determine what interpretation of ‗compulsory license‘ TRIPS adopts by considering 
historical practices, legislative intent, and policy. Part III.A.3 separately considers 
intratextual observations. 
At one point during Agreement negotiations, Article 31 was entitled ―Compulsory 
Licenses/Licences of Right/Use for Government Purposes.‖69 There is no record detailing 
why the title of Article 31 was ultimately changed to ―Other Use Without Authorization 
of the Right Holder.‖ Perhaps it was to distinguish between unauthorized use permitted 
under Article 30 and unauthorized use permitted under Article 31.70 Perhaps the group 
felt that the language ultimately used was less disposed to national idiosyncrasies of 
interpretation and understanding.71 Knowing the answer might help determine whether 
Article 31 contemplates more than the narrower definition of compulsory license Black’s 
Law Dictionary and Judge Prost put forward.  
One hint that ―Compulsory Licenses/Licences of Right/Use for Government 
Purposes‖ and ―Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder‖ may be 
synonymous can be found in the Doha Declaration, which clarified and interpreted the 
Agreement. Unlike TRIPS itself, the Doha Declaration explicitly uses the term 
―compulsory licence‖ in the context of discussing Article-31-related matters.72 If ―other 
use without authorization of the right holder‖ is synonymous with the term ―compulsory 
license,‖ determining the breadth of compulsory licensing is appropriate to determine the 
breadth of Article 31. 
                                                 
67 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006) (―Scope of exclusive rights in nondramatic musical works: 
Compulsory license for making and distributing phonorecords‖).  
68 See Reichman & Hasenzahl, supra note 64, at 3. 
69 GATT Secretariat, Status of Work in the Negotiating Group – Chairman’s Report to the 
GNG, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/76, Part III § 5 ¶ 5 (Jul. 23, 1990), available at 
http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/ English/SULPDF/92110034.pdf; see also Correa, supra note 64, 
at 20 (footnote omitted) (noting that a license of right is a particular type of compulsory license 
―provided in the UK and other countries.‖); Correa, supra note 64, 20 n.35 (citation omitted) 
(―‗Licenses of rights‘ are also available under UK and other national laws when a patentee 
voluntarily throws his/her invention open to anyone who asks for a license on terms to be agreed 
upon with him/her or, in the absence of agreement, on terms to be settled by the Patent Office.‖).  
70 Resource Book, supra note 17, at 461. 
71 See GATT Secretariat, Synoptic Tables Setting Out Existing International Standards and 
Proposed Standards and Principles, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/32/Rev.2, 99-103 (Feb. 1990), 
available at http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/ English/SULPDF/92090140.pdf [hereinafter Synoptic 
Tables] (listing existing proposed standards for compulsory licenses by several countries and 
unions).  
72 Doha Declaration, supra note 37, ¶ 5(b).  





1. In Support of the Narrow Definition 
 
Assuming the terms are coextensive, there are reasons to conclude that the 
narrower definition of compulsory license applies to Article 31. By the early 1990s about 
one hundred countries permitted varying degrees of compulsory licensing of patents, but 
the U.S. was not among them.73 For example, in Europe ―it is generally the case that, 
where compulsory licence provisions are in place, any third party may apply to the 
national patent authority for the grant of a licence‖ provided timing, negotiation, and 
grounds requirements are met.74 Because the U.S. was interested in the strongest possible 
intellectual property rights, it wanted to limit the compulsory licensing provisions of 
other nations.75 However, ―[c]ontroversy over the appropriate scope of compulsory 
licensing is cited as one of the reasons TRIPS negotiations were initiated.‖76 Not 
surprisingly, a compromise resulted.77 If viewed as a concession by the U.S., Article 31 
represents a settlement as to the permissible scope of statutory compulsory licensing 
schemes.  
Moreover, the prior negotiation condition set forth in paragraph (b) of Article 31 
presupposes that an infringer has prior knowledge of a patent because the infringer would 
                                                 
73 Reichman & Hasenzahl, supra note 64, at 3, 4 (―Historically . . . the US never adopted a 
general statute to regulate non-voluntary licensing of patented inventions either on grounds of 
misuse or on public interest grounds.‖). See generally Resource Book, supra note 17, at 462 
(describing compulsory licensing provisions and policies).  
74 Association of Patent Law Firms, Compulsory License Provisions Across Europe, 
http://www.aplf.org/compulsory-licence-provisions-across-europe/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2008); see 
also HLBBshaw, Compulsory Licenses Under the UK Patents Act, 
http://www.hlbbshaw.com/docs/pageview/ pageview_20070104153803.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 
2008) (stating that ―any person may apply to the UK Patent Office for a compulsory license under 
the patent‖).  
75 See Wegner, supra note 9, at 163 (stating that the U.S. pharmaceutical industry ―drew up the 
tightest possible rules against compulsory licensing that could be imagined at the time.‖); Stern-
Dombal, supra note 15, at 273 (―The United States strongly opposes compulsory licensing 
provisions in international treaties.‖). 
76 Resource Book, supra note 17, at 463. 
77 Jerome H. Reichman & Catherine Hasenzahl, Non-voluntary Licensing of Patented 
Inventions: Historical Perspective, Legal Framework Under TRIPS, and an Overview of the 
Practice in Canada and the U.S.A 14 (UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on IPRs & Sustainable Dev. 
Series, Issue Paper No. 5, 2003), available at 
http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/ictsd_series/iprs/CS_reichman_hasenzahl.pdf (an Indian proposal was 
ultimately accepted ―without any restrictions having been placed on the grounds for which states 
could grant licenses.‖). 




not even know to negotiate if the infringer was unaware of the existence of the patent. 78 
A diligent patent search cannot possibly uncover all of the potential infringements and 
would leave the searcher hopelessly paralyzed as it sought a legal opinion or attempted to 
negotiate for each and every patent that potentially could be infringed. The infringer 
could be heavily invested before either party, in good faith, came to realize the 
infringement. If the parties could not settle the issue on their own, a court would not have 
the option to deny injunctive relief because Article 31‘s prior negotiation condition was 
not met—the parties had not negotiated prior to the unauthorized use. The result would 
be that the infringer would be either forced to pay a higher licensing fee79 or desist 
completely. Thus interpreted, this requirement heavily favors non-practicing entities 
whose modus operandi is to charge arguably exorbitant licensing fees80—an undesirable 
outcome. 
Because American pharmaceutical manufacturers largely drafted Article 31,81 a 
more tenable interpretation of Article 31 is that it was motivated by an interest in 
preventing willful infringement of protected pharmaceuticals and curtailing compulsory 
                                                 
78 This presupposition is based on the definition of the phrase ―such use‖ in Article 31. There 
are two possible definitions. First, ―such use‖ could mean ―use without authorization of the right 
holder.‖ Under this definition, ―such use‖ would occur the moment an infringer first used the 
subject matter of the patent. Second, ―such use‖ could mean ―use authorized by government but 
unauthorized by the right holder.‖ Under this latter definition, ―such use‖ would refer to use 
starting from when a government allowed an infringer to use the subject matter. While the second 
definition provides a window of time in which an infringer could become informed of his 
infringement, this definition causes grammatical redundancies when substituted into the language 
of Article 31. For example, Article 31(a) would read: ―authorization of use authorized by 
government but unauthorized by the right holder shall be considered on its individual merits.‖ 
That is, the phrase ―authorized by government‖ contributes no additional meaning to the 
sentence. For this reason, the definition of ―such use‖ is likely ―use without authorization of the 
right holder,‖ giving rise to the presupposition implication of Article 31(b).  
79 One could argue that a significantly higher licensing fee would trigger the anti-competition 
provision of Article 31, section (k), and the prior negotiation requirement would be waived. 
However, it is not clear at what point higher licensing fees become anti-competitive. In addition, 
even a reasonable licensing fee might be an additional cost that the innocent infringer cannot 
bear. 
80 Wegner notes that when TRIPS was signed in 1994, the issue of non-practicing entities (a 
species of which is known as ―patent troll‖) was not fully appreciated. Wegner, supra note 9, at 
163. Patent trolls are ―non-practicing entities seeking exorbitant licensing fees by threat of 
injunction.‖ Stern-Dombal, supra note 15, at 250 n.12 (citing Ryan Eddings, Note, Trolls and 
Titans Take Fight to Top Court, 18 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 503, 503-04 (2006)). The term is 
conclusory and biased, and courts have resisted using the term. See Posting of Dennis Crouch to 
Patent Law Blog (Patently-O), Courts Resist Using the Term Patent Troll, 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2008/03/courts-resist-u.html (Mar. 24, 2008, 3:35 EST). 
81 Wegner, supra note 9, at 163. 




licensing statutes unreasonably favorable to domestic interests. 82 For example, a 
developing nation such as India, unable to pay the monopoly rents of a protected 
pharmaceutical produced by a developed country, would seek to manufacture the 
compound domestically at a great savings. Indeed, during the TRIPS negotiations, India 
asserted that ―each country must be free to specify the grounds on which compulsory 
licences can be granted under its law and the conditions for such grant,‖ 83 and 
―developing countries should be free to provide for the automatic grant of non-voluntary 
licenses in sectors of critical importance to them[.]‖ 84 In order to stem this practice, the 
pharmaceutical industry—the primary drafters of Article 3185—included the prior 
negotiation requirement. Because the prior negotiation requirement under the broad 
construction of compulsory license would plausibly lead to unfair outcomes, the narrower 
interpretation is favored—meaning that there is room for equitable relief. 
Regarding Article 5A, the intended definition of compulsory license is likewise 
open to interpretation. Paragraph (2) refers to ―legislative measures providing for the 
grant of compulsory licenses.‖86 The term ―legislative measures‖ arguably envisions a 
statutorily created licensing authority. Paragraph (4) provides additional support for this 
proposition by referring to compulsory licenses as being ―applied for.‖87 While instituting 
a lawsuit or asserting a compulsory license counterclaim can be interpreted as applying 
for a compulsory license, it is on the outer limits of what one might consider the 
definition of ―apply‖ to cover.  
However, commentators note that the U.S. has a long history of granting 
compulsory licenses to remedy anti-competitive practices,88 often in the form of consent 
decrees.89 Since paragraph (k) of Article 31 addresses anti-competitive behavior,90 one 
might argue that Article 31 covers judicially-imposed compulsory licenses. There are 
three responses to this assertion. First, arguing that a provision is involuntary in a consent 
                                                 
82 See Stern-Dombal, supra note 15, at 265 (―The thrust of the compulsory licensing debate 
centered on the licensing of pharmaceutical products to treat public health epidemics in 
developing nations.‖). 
83 Synoptic Tables, supra note 71, at 97. Similarly, Peru proposed, ―Any person may apply for 
the grant of a compulsory license‖ provided certain conditions had occurred. Id. at 101. Japan‘s 
proposal also used ―application‖ language. Id. at 97. 
84 Synoptic Tables, supra note 71, at 99. 
85 Wegner, supra note 9, at 163. 
86 Paris Convention, supra note 34, art. 5A(2). 
87 Id. art. 5A(4). 
88 Correa, supra note 64, at 14. 
89 Reichmann & Hasenzahl, supra note 77, at 19. 
90 TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 31(k). 




decree, which expresses voluntary agreement between parties,91 strains logic. That is, a 
consent decree that includes use of patent rights should not be categorized as a 
compulsory license because the patent holder has agreed to the decree‘s terms. Second, 
during Agreement negotiations, the U.S. initially advocated that compulsory licenses be 
given ―solely to address, only during its existence, a declared national emergency[,] to 
remedy an adjudicated violation of antitrust laws,‖ or for government use. 92 These limited 
grounds were more restrictive than the controlling American law at the time, Continental 
Paper Bag.93 Yet, it was also understood that TRIPS was an international codification of 
the American law of injunctive relief.94 The incongruity between the U.S. standard and 
the U.S. proposal suggests that compulsory licenses and denials of injunctive relief were 
considered separate issues.95 Third, the Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988, codified as § 
271(d) of the Patent Act,96 arguably provides a statutory basis for compulsory licensing to 
remedy anti-competitive practices.97 Though, to be sure, commentators note that the law 
surrounding patent misuse and antitrust is complex and at times inconsistent.98 Moreover, 
28 U.S.C. § 149899 also provides a statutory basis for government use and, logically, use 
                                                 
91 Black‘s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) (―A court decree that all parties agree to.‖).  
92 Synoptic Tables, supra note 711, at 96 (emphasis added).  
93 Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908). Continental 
Paper Bag established the principle that a patent holder is not obligated to use his patent. 
Admittedly, the Continental Paper Bag line of cases established a restrictive standard, but 
exceptions were still available in areas outside national emergencies, antitrust violations, and 
government use. See Wegner, supra note 9, at 162; see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Yahoo! Inc. 
in Support of Petitioner, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-
130), 2005 U.S. Briefs 130, 14. 
94 Wegner, supra note 9, at 163. 
95 This interpretation is supported by the fact that the U.S. was not the only country that 
advocated compulsory licenses to thwart anti-competitive practices. For example, Australia, 
Hong Kong, and New Zealand explicitly advocated for inclusion of an anti-competition 
provision. Synoptic Tables, supra note 71, at 96-100. 
96 Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988, 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2006). 
97 Section 271(d) lists specific acts that are not to be deemed misuse of patent rights. 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(d) (2006).  
98 See generally 6 Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents § 19.04 (2008). 
99 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2006). The section begins: 
Whenever an invention described in and covered by a patent of the United 
States is used or manufactured by or for the United States without license of the 
owner thereof or lawful right to use or manufacture the same, the owner‘s 
remedy shall be by action against the United States in the United States Court of 




to address a national emergency. Thus, all three grounds enumerated by the U.S. had a 
statutory basis. 
If one accepts that the narrower understanding of a compulsory license applies to 
Article 31 and Article 5A, then judicial denials of injunctive relief in favor of an ongoing 
royalty fall outside the area circumscribed by the articles. Thus, the remaining hurdles to 
compliance would be ensuring that a denial of injunctive relief is non-discriminatory and 
that the principles and objectives of the Agreement are satisfied.100 This would mean that 
a pattern of favoring a place of invention, field of technology, or location of production 
would not be permissible absent perhaps a compelling justification. 101 In addition, a 
denial of injunctive relief could not disserve the public interest or be unfair to the right 
holder.102 If these conditions are met, a court may deny injunctive relief because TRIPS 
Article 44 merely requires that ―judicial authorities shall have the authority‖ to grant 
injunctions.103 Article 44 does not require that every infringement entail an injunction 
because to so conclude would read ―have the authority to‖ out of the text.  
One may argue that a lax judiciary would result if it served the member‘s 
interests. However, if a court did apply a less stringent standard of review to patents, the 
court would be undercutting its country‘s own incentives for domestic innovation. 
Moreover, other member nations could argue before the Dispute Settlement Body that the 
country was failing to honor the exclusive rights conferred in Article 28.  
 
 
2. In Support of the Broad Definition 
 
However, there are reasons to conclude that the broader definition of compulsory 
license—which would include judicial orders—is intended. First, the term ―law‖ in 
Article 31 is unqualified.104 As such, the plain meaning of the term covers both common 
and statutory law. To conclude that the term only applies to statutory law would 
impermissibly read a limitation into the text. Simply, there is no explicit statement that 
such a limitation was intended, and, moreover, the broader definition of compulsory 
                                                                                                                                                 
Federal Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation for 
such use and manufacture.  
100 See Part II.A supra.  
101 TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 27.1; see also Reichman & Hasenzahl, supra note 64, at 2. 
102 TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 7. 
103 Id. art. 44 (stating in part, ―[t]he judicial authorities shall have the authority to order a party 
to desist from an infringement, inter alia to prevent the entry into the channels of commerce in 
their jurisdiction of imported goods that involve the infringement of an intellectual property right, 
immediately after customs clearance of such goods‖). 
104 Id. art. 31 (―Where the law of a Member allows for other use of the subject matter of a 
patent without the authorization of the right holder . . . .‖) (footnote omitted).  




license is not unreasonable, as evinced by the many commentators and judges who 
employ it.105 
Second, conditions set forth in Article 31 arguably conflict with the narrower 
definition. For instance, the requirement that consideration be on individual merits106 is 
arguably far different from Judge Prost‘s contention that anyone who meets the statutory 
criteria is granted a license.107 The prior negotiation condition emphasizes this same 
distinction. On the other hand, these conditions reflect the policy judgment that 
abridgment of a patentee‘s exclusive rights is not to be taken lightly. The prior 
negotiation condition, for example, demonstrates that the preferred policy is for the 
interested parties to resolve the situation among themselves. 
Third, the history of the Agreement negotiations supports the notion that the 
strongest possible protection of exclusive rights was desired.108 Moreover, the conclusion 
in Part 3.A.1 supra that Article 31 was a concession by U.S. negotiators (whereby the 
largely foreign practice of compulsory licensing was limited but permitted to continue) 
was purely speculative, and the plain language of the provision does not reveal any basis 
for that assertion. Thus, in keeping with the goal of strong patent rights enforcement, 
Article 31 should be the arbiter of all limitations on exclusive rights where Article 30 
does not control, thereby constraining judicial discretion.  
Fourth, not including judicial orders under Article 31 would essentially end-run 
the goals of TRIPS. That is, arguing semantics does not alter the conclusion that a denial 
of injunctive relief has, in practice, the same effect for the parties involved as a 
compulsory license. Indeed, commentators have suggested that denying injunctive relief 
is a de facto compulsory license.109 
Yet, one may question whether a denial of injunctive relief in favor of an ongoing 
royalty is actually the same in practice as a compulsory license. If one concludes that they 
are the same—and, thus, the costs associated with each are equal—then a denial of 
injunctive relief is an effective end run around a compulsory licensing system. However, 
the two are not the same—at least not in the U.S. First, when a court denies injunctive 
relief, it has already concluded that the patent is valid and infringed. Contrariwise, in a 
compulsory licensing system, a patent‘s validity may be uncertain unless it has been the 
subject of a prior adjudication. All else being equal, a patent that has been upheld 
judicially is more valuable and commands more bargaining power than one whose 
                                                 
105 See generally Paice, L.L.C. v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1136 (2007) (Rader, J., 
concurring); Reichman & Hasenzahl, supra note 64; Correa, supra note 64. 
106 TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 31(a). 
107 See Paice, L.L.C. v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1313 n.13 (2007). 
108 Wegner, supra note 9, at 163. 
109 Correa & Yusuf, supra note 27, at 424; 2-8 Roger M. Milgrim, Milgrim on Licensing 
§ 8.55 (2007).  




validity is less certain.110 The damages or remuneration awarded will consequently be 
greater in an infringement proceeding than under a compulsory licensing regime. 
Moreover, the process of obtaining a compulsory license generally entails less risk than 
an infringement proceeding. In an infringement proceeding, treble damages for 
willfulness are possible.111 Also, in addition to the substantial legal fees involved, an 
infringer may have invested in the infrastructure to produce the patented invention.  
 
 
3. Intratextual Observations 
 
The preceding analysis addressed historical practices, legislative intent, and 
policy concerns. An intratextual analysis—primarily focusing on Article 44—also 
provides cues as to the nature and reach of Article 31. 
Article 44, entitled ―Injunctions,‖ addresses the availability of injunctive relief:  
 
1. The judicial authorities shall have the authority to order a party to 
desist from an infringement, inter alia to prevent the entry into the 
channels of commerce in their jurisdiction of imported goods that involve 
the infringement of an intellectual property right, immediately after 
customs clearance of such goods. Members are not obliged to accord such 
authority in respect of protected subject matter acquired or ordered by a 
person prior to knowing or having reasonable grounds to know that 
dealing in such subject matter would entail the infringement of an 
intellectual property right.  
 
2. Notwithstanding the other provisions of this Part and provided that 
the provisions of Part II specifically addressing use by governments, or by 
third parties authorized by a government, without the authorization of the 
right holder are complied with, Members may limit the remedies available 
against such use to payment of remuneration in accordance with 
subparagraph (h) of Article 31. In other cases, the remedies under this Part 
shall apply or, where these remedies are inconsistent with a Member‘s 
law, declaratory judgments and adequate compensation shall be 
available.112 
 
Unlike Article 31, Article 44 is located in Part III, ―Enforcement of Intellectual Property 
Rights.‖ Based on this structure and recognizing that ―the creation of a right is distinct 
                                                 
110 Cf. Paice, L.L.C. v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1317 (2007) (Rader, J., 
concurring) (―[P]re-suit and post-judgment acts of infringement are distinct, and may warrant 
different royalty rates given the change in the parties‘ legal relationship and other factors.‖).  
111 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). 
112 TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 44. 




from the provision of remedies for violations of that right,‖ 113 one could argue that 
Article 31 (like Article 30) merely sets out limitations on exclusive rights, and it is 
Article 44 that controls whether an injunction should be granted (and Part III in general 
that controls which remedies are available).  
Including a sentence in Article 44 that injunctive relief for patent infringement 
must follow when the terms of Articles 30 and 31 are not met would have removed all 
doubt. Instead, the drafters took the opposite approach. Paragraph 2 of Article 44 states 
that if the provisions of Article 31 are met, remedies available may be limited to payment 
of remuneration in accordance with Article 31(h),114 and if Article 31 is not met all 
remedies ―apply,‖115 including damages,116 injunctions,117 and ―other remedies,‖118 such 
as destruction of infringing products. This formulation is interesting because Article 44.1 
merely requires that ―the judicial authorities . . . have the authority to order‖ an 
injunction.119 Thus, this second sentence requires only that injunctions be available. Yet, 
read strictly, Article 31 would seem to permit compulsory licenses only where its terms 
are precisely met. 
This tension does not help determine whether the broad definition or narrow 
definition of compulsory license was intended for Article 31. That is, there are two ways 
to resolve this incongruity. The first is to conclude that Article 31 applies only to 
statutory compulsory licensing schemes. The second is to conclude that Article 31 applies 
to all compulsory licenses, but that Article 31 is not to be read strictly. If the second 
interpretation is adopted, Article 44 suggests that it is the spirit more than the letter that is 
to be followed when applying the provisions of Article 31. Thus, under the second 
interpretation, a reading that would categorically require an injunction to issue if Article 
31‘s terms were not met is likely untenable. 
 
 
4. Which Definition? 
 
Ultimately, both the broad and narrow interpretations of compulsory license as 
applied to Article 31 are reasonable and supported by a multiplicity of sources. One 
                                                 
113 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006). Justice Kennedy agreed, 
stating, ―[b]oth the terms of the Patent Act and the traditional view of injunctive relief accept that 
the existence of a right to exclude does not dictate the remedy for a violation of the right.‖ Id. at 
396 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
114 TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 44.2. 
115 Id. art. 44.2. 
116 Id. art. 45. 
117 Id. art. 44. 
118 Id. art. 46. 
119 Id. art. 44.1. 




definitive conclusion to draw is that there is little justification to assert that all outcomes 
dictated by Article 31 are per se TRIPS compliant. The potential unjust and socially 
undesirable outcome that can occur when an innocent infringer fails to have negotiated, 
combined with intratextual observations, supports finding that in some circumstances 
Article 31 should not control—at least not in toto. Whether this means conditions of 
Article 31 can be waived when necessary or that Article 31 does not apply at all in certain 
circumstances is not clear. However, because it is reasonable to conclude that the 
provisions of Article 31 generally apply, it is hard to argue that a further narrowed 
interpretation should be preferred. In both cases, there is room for equitable discretion. 
Yet, if Article 31 does not at all cover judicial denials of injunctive relief, then courts 
should be free to determine an equitable outcome in accordance with the principles and 
objectives of TRIPS. So concluding, this Note will now turn to current U.S. patent law 
jurisprudence and its compliance with the observations noted thus far.  
 
 





Section 283 of the U.S. Patent Act states that ―[t]he several courts having 
jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant injunctions in accordance with the 
principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms 
as the court deems reasonable.‖120 Accordingly, eBay held that 
 
[a] plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test 
before a court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that 
it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, 
such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; 
(3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and 
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest 
would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.121 
 
The concurrences of Justices Roberts 122 and Kennedy123 both emphasized that a 
departure from the historical practice was not to be taken lightly, hinting that injunctive 
relief should remain the usual remedy. Justice Kennedy‘s opinion in particular highlights 
that eBay and the reaffirmation of the four-factor test change very little: 
 
                                                 
120 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006) (emphasis added).  
121 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
122 Id. at 394 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).  
123 Id. at 395 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 




To the extent earlier cases establish a pattern of granting an injunction 
against patent infringers almost as a matter of course, this pattern simply 
illustrates the result of the four-factor test in contexts then prevalent. The 
lesson of historical practice, therefore, is most helpful and instructive 
when the circumstances of a case bear substantial parallels to litigation the 
courts have confronted before.124 
 
In Justice Kennedy‘s opinion, therefore, the status quo should generally be maintained 
and only in cases that lack historical guidance should the four-factor test really serve as a 
hurdle to injunctive relief. Justice Kennedy then asserts that those cases lacking historical 
guidance predominately concern the non-practicing entity.125 The question after eBay was 
to what extent trial courts would depart from historical practices. Would district courts 
engage in the four-factor analysis as a perfunctory gesture to satisfy eBay or would courts 
upend the status quo in place since Continental Paper Bag126? 
 
 
B. Post-eBay Denials of Injunctive Relief 
 
As of early 2008, permanent injunctive relief has been denied in at least twelve 
cases since eBay.127 For the most part, it appears that district courts are following Justice 
                                                 
124 Id. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
125 Id. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (―In cases now arising trial courts should bear in mind 
that in many instances the nature of the patent being enforced and the economic function of the 
patent holder present consideration quite unlike earlier cases.‖); see also Wegner, supra note 9, at 
164 (―It was only when the Foundation of the late Jerome Lemelson sought high royalty 
payments without working their patents that the modus operandi of the current non-working 
patentee-plaintiff developed.‖). 
126 Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908). 
127 See Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 517 F.3d 1353, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (upholding denial of 
injunctive relief); Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(same); Respironics, Inc. v. Invacare Corp., No. 04-0336, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1174, at *13 
(W.D. Pa. Jan 7, 2008) (denying injunction); Baden Sports, Inc. v. Molten, No. C06-210MJP, 
2007 WL 2056402, at *10-11 (W.D. Wash. July 16, 2007) (denying injunction); IMX, Inc. v. 
Lendingtree, LLC, 469 F. Supp. 2d 203, 226 (D. Del. 2007) (denying injunction); Praxair, Inc. v. 
ATMI, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 2d 440, 444 (D. Del. 2007) (denying injunction), aff'd in part and rev'd 
in part, No. 2007-1483, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 20437 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 29, 2008); MercExchange, 
L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 568 (E.D. Va. 2007) (denying injunction); Sundance, 
Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., No. 02-73543, 2007 WL 37742, *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 4, 2007) 
(denying injunction), injunction granted, 2007 WL 3053662 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 19, 2007); Finisar 
Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-264, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76380, at *4 (E.D. Tex. 
July 7, 2006) (denying injunction), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 523 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008); 
KEG Techs., Inc. v. Laimer, 436 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1371 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (refusing to reach 
decision on injunction until parties confer); Voda v. Cordis Corp., No. CIV-03-1512-L, 2006 WL 
2570614, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Sep. 5, 2006) (denying injunction); z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft 




Kennedy‘s opinion, preserving the status quo except in circumstances ―quite unlike 
earlier cases,‖128 namely, non-practicing entities. In seven of the cases where permanent 
injunctive relief was denied, plaintiffs were non-practicing entities.129 In three other 
cases, permanent injunctions were denied for providing insufficient specific evidence to 
apply in the four-factor test.130 In Baden Sports v. Molten,131 a genuine issue of 
obviousness prevented a permanent injunction. Finally, in Respironics v. Invacare,132 the 
court denied a permanent injunction because the jury found only that Invacare‘s trade 
show device infringed Respironic‘s patent; Respironics sought a permanent injunction 
regarding other Invacare devices, but the jury had not found that these devices 
infringed.133 One commentator noted in mid 2007 that of twenty-two cases granting a 
permanent injunction, only one involved a non-practicing entity.134  
However, because eBay is a relatively recent decision, the first wave of cases 
applying the four-factor test remains somewhat in a state of flux. For example, in fall of 
2007 commentators counted Innogenetics v. Abbott Labs135 as a case granting injunctive 
                                                                                                                                                 
Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 444 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (denying injunction), aff’d, 507 F.3d 1340 
(Fed. Cir. 2007). See generally Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Aftermath of eBay v. 
MercExchange, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006): A Review of Subsequent Judicial Decisions, 89 J. Pat. & 
Trademark Off. Soc‘y 631 (Aug. 2007) (reviewing grants and denials of injunctive relief in patent 
cases post-eBay); Iancu & Nichols, supra note 3 (same); Edward D. Manzo, Injunctions in Patent 
Cases After eBay, 7 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 44 (Fall 2007) (same).  
128 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
129 See Amado, 517 F.2d at 1361; Paice, 504 F.3d at 1303; MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 
560-561;; Sundance, 2007 WL 37742, at *1, injunction granted, 2007 WL 3053662 (E.D. Mich. 
2007); Finisar, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76380; Voda, 2006 WL 2570614, at *4; z4 Techs., 434 F. 
Supp. 2d at *7, aff’d, 507 F.3d 1340  (Fed. Cir. 2007). See generally Beckerman-Rodau, supra  
note 127; Iancu & Nichols, supra note 3; Manzo, supra note 127. Commentators differ as to 
whether z4 Technologies was a non-practicing entity. Compare Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 
127, at 569 with Iancu & Nichols, supra note 3, at 397. 
130 See Praxair, 479 F.Supp.2d 440; IMX, 469 F. Supp. 2d 203; KEG Techs, 436 F. Supp. 2d 
1364. 
131 Baden Sports, 2007 WL 2056402 (W.D. Wash. July 16, 2007)(order denying permanent 
injunction).  
132 Respironics, Inc. v. Invacare Corp., No. 04-0336, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1174 (W.D. Pa. 
Jan. 8, 2008)(order denying permanent injunction).  
133 Id. at *5. 
134 See Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 127, at 658 (citing Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. 
Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech. Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 600 (E.D. Tex. 2007)). 
135 Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs, No. 05-C-0575-C, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3148 (W.D. 
Wis. Jan. 12, 2007). 




relief.136 On appeal in 2008, however, the Federal Circuit vacated the order. 137 
Conversely, the district court in Sundance v. DeMonte initially denied injunctive relief, 
but in 2008 issued an injunction because of changed circumstances. 138 Despite the 
unsettled case law and while interpretation of these recent cases lacks the benefit of 
substantial hindsight, a clear trend has emerged where non-practicing entities are 
generally failing to satisfy the four-factor test. Commentators have tied this to a larger 
―market competition‖ requirement.139 
The subsequent cases also illustrate that the courts are giving careful 
consideration to social and economic welfare and balancing the rights a nd obligations of 
the patent holder. Courts are tending to look behind the claims to divine a plaintiff‘s true 
motive, which, as Justice Kennedy suggested, is usually money. 140 For example, on 
remand, the district court in eBay noted: ―Utilization of a ruling in equity as a bargaining 
chip suggests both that such party never deserved a ruling in equity and that money is all 
that such party truly seeks, rendering monetary damages an adequate remedy in the first 
instance.‖141 The ―bargaining chip‖ practice alone does not warrant a denial of injunctive 
relief, but helps tip the four-factor analysis in favor of the infringer. The court continued: 
―Although monetary relief will be obtained through the court rather than through a 
negotiated license agreement, in the end, MercExchange receives what it has consistently 
                                                 
136 See Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 127, at 658 (citing Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. 
Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech. Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 600 (E.D. Tex. 2007)). 
137 Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs, 512 F.3d 1363, 1380 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 17, 2008) (vacating 
district court‘s grant of injunctive relief on abuse of discretion standard because reasonable 
royalty award for past infringement included ―upfront entry fee that contemplate[d] or [wa]s 
based upon future sales by Abbott in a long term market‖).  
138 Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte, No. 02-73543, 2007 WL 37742 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 4, 2007), 
injunction granted,  2007 WL 3053662 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 19, 2007). 
139 See Manzo, supra note 127, at 68 (―The usual reason for denying the injunction is an 
absence of competition between the parties and no harm to goodwill, market share, or the like.‖). 
See generally Benjamin H. Diessel, Trolling for Trolls: The Pitfalls of the Emerging Market 
Competition Requirement for Permanent Injunctions in Patent Cases Post-eBay, 106 Mich. L. 
Rev. 305 (Nov. 2007). 
140 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(―For [non-practicing entities], an injunction, and the potentially serious sanctions arising from its 
violation, can be employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek 
to buy licenses to practice the patent.‖). 
141 MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 582 (E.D. Va. 2007). 




sought: money.‖142 Consistent with these observations, MercExchange and eBay settled 
in February of 2008.143 
 
 
V. EBAY AND COMPLIANCE WITH TRIPS 
 
Despite this Note‘s conclusion that Article 31 does not control  in all 
circumstances of denials of injunctive relief (and may not control in any), it is not 
unreasonable to think that the TRIPS Dispute Settlement Body may hold a different 
opinion. Even under such an interpretation, cases denying injunctive relief generally 
comply with Article 31. However, additional interpretation of the Agreement is necessary 
to determine how current U.S. law might be TRIPS compliant without changing the law 
itself. Paragraph (k) of Article 31, which addresses anti-competitive practices, and Article 
44, which addresses injunctive relief, are two key provisions to consider. 
Paragraph (k) of Article 31 provides additional discretion when granting 
compulsory licenses to remedy ―anti-competitive‖ practices.144 Article 40 appears to 
define anti-competitive practices as behavior ―having an adverse impact on competition 
in the relevant market.‖145 It also suggests that ―anti-competitive‖ practices and abuse of 
intellectual property rights are not coextensive; that abuse of rights does not necessar ily 
entail an anti-competitive practice.146 The Agreement lists grantbacks and tying as 
examples of anti-competitive practices;147 another example is refusal to deal.148 It is 
unclear how difficult it would be to establish an abuse of rights as anti-competitive in the 
U.S. in light of the Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988, which states that refusal to license 
and tying are not patent misuse.149 However, in the event that an abuse of patent rights is 
anti-competitive, the prior negotiation150 and domestic supply151 conditions of Article 31 
                                                 
142 Id. at 587. 
143 Press Release, eBay Inc., eBay Inc. and MercExchange, L.L.C. Reach Settlement 
Agreement (Feb. 28, 2008), available at 
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ebay/268909602x0x175182/da64aef4-b963-4487-
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144 TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 31(k). 
145 Id. art. 40.2. 
146 Id. (recognizing that particular cases of licensing practices may ―constitute an abuse of 
intellectual property rights having an adverse effect on competition in the relevant market‖)  
147 Id. 
148 See generally Chisum, supra note 98. 
149 Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988 § 201, 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2006). 
150 TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 31(b) 




are waived. In addition, the court may take the behavior of the right holder into account 
when determining the amount of remuneration.152 Without these conditions, the court 
would have considerable discretion to fashion an ongoing royalty remedy.  
 Article 44 sets forth what Dratler & McJohn refer to as the ―escape clause.‖153 It 
is buried in paragraph 2 of Article 44 and states that where injunctions ―are inconsistent 
with a Member‘s law, declaratory judgments and adequate compensation shal l be 
available.‖154 If one concludes that injunctions must issue if the conditions of Article 31 
are not met, then one can naturally also conclude that such categorical grants of 
injunctive relief are inconsistent with U.S. law, which under eBay requires satisfying the 
four-factor test. The final step in this train of logic is to conclude that the U.S. essentially 
can do whatever it wants. The 52 intellectual property professors made a similar 
argument in their eBay brief.155 Dratler & McJohn argue that this logic is wrong, 
however, because it adopts an incorrect definition of ―inconsistent.‖ The authors outline 
three possible interpretations of the word: 
 
First, a remedy might be ‗inconsistent‘ with a Member‘s law if that 
Member‘s law provides no such remedy on the date of application of the 
TRIPS Agreement for that Member. Second, a remedy might be 
‗inconsistent‘ with a Member‘s law if that remedy is totally lacking in that 
Member, whether as a means of enforcing intellectual property rights or 
any other rights. Finally, a remedy might be ‗inconsistent‘ with a 
Member‘s law if it contravenes constitutional or other fundamental 
systemic requirements that cannot be modified by legislation. 156 
 
Applying principles of contract interpretation, Dratler & McJohn conclude that the 
second interpretation is the most attractive and reasonable.157 Under this interpretation, 
                                                                                                                                                 
151 Id. art. 31(f) 
152 Id. art. 31(k). 
153 Dratler & McJohn, supra note 9, § 1A.07[3], at 1A-112.  
154 TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 44.2 (stating that ―[i]n other cases, the remedies under [Part III, 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights] shall apply or, where these remedies are inconsistent 
with a Member‘s law, declaratory judgments and adequate compensation shall be available‖).  
155 Brief Amici Curiae of 52 Intellectual Property Professors in Support of Petitioners, eBay 
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130), 2005 U.S. Briefs 130, 10 
(―Article 44 itself permits nations to avoid granting courts even the authority to order injunctive 
relief in cases of innocent infringement and where injunctive relief is ‗inconsistent with a 
Member‘s law.‘‖ (citations omitted)). 
156 Dratler & McJohn, supra note 9, § 1A.07[3][b], at 1A-112. 
157 Id. 




the ―escape clause‖ does not bring the U.S. into TRIPS compliance. However, a measure 
as drastic as the ―escape clause‖ is not necessary anyway.  
 Echoing the concerns of Articles 8, 31(k), and 40, Justice Kennedy‘s eBay 
concurrence highlighted the issue of non-practicing entities, noting that ―[a]n industry has 
developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, 
instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.‖158 In light of these developments, Justice 
Kennedy recognized that 
 
[f]or [non-practicing entities], an injunction, and the potentially serious 
sanctions arising from its violation, can be employed as a bargaining tool 
to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy licenses to practice 
the patent. When the patented invention is but a small component of the 
product the companies seek to produce and the threat of an injunction is 
employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations, legal damages may 
well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement and an injunction 
may not serve the public interest.159 
 
If courts give weight to Justice Kennedy‘s concerns in their four-factor analysis, 
then eBay is probably consistent with TRIPS even in the event that Article 31 is given a 
broad interpretation.160 Indeed, as discussed in Part III.B supra, whether an entity 
practices its patent has weighed heavily determining whether a district court denies 
injunctive relief.161 Yet, despite non-practicing status being a reliable predictor, it has not 
proven dispositive. How courts have carefully weighed the interests involved should 
satisfy Article 7 of TRIPS, which states that the ―protection and enforcement of 
intellectual property rights‖ should be ―in a manner conducive to social and economic 
welfare, and [contribute] to a balance of rights and obligations.‖162  
Post-eBay decisions also generally comply with Article 31. Because Article 31, as 
reiterated by the Doha Declaration, provides that compulsory licenses may be granted on 
any grounds a country deems appropriate, the requirements of Article 5A(4) for non-
working can be avoided. Thus, courts can grant compulsory licenses for patents of any 
                                                 
158 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(citation omitted). 
159 Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).  
160 See Stern-Dombal, supra note 15, at 9 (―The emerging scenario is that most court-ordered 
compulsory licenses will comply with Article 31.‖).  
161 See Iancu & Nichols, supra note 3, at 397 (reporting that as of mid 2007, the five reported 
decisions denying injunctive relief all involved a non-practicing entity); see also Beckerman-
Rodau, supra note 127, at 659 (reporting that as of late 2007, five of six reported decisions 
denying injunctive relief involved a non-practicing entity).  
162 TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 7. 




age, provided another ground can be identified. This could be as simple as invoking the 
public interest.163 
 The two primary issues remaining are the license termination164 and prior 
negotiation165 requirements. The termination condition is likely of little moment because 
termination is ―subject to adequate protection of the legitimate interests of the [license 
holder.]‖166 Thus, in practice, this standard is probably largely toothless and will result in 
licenses being for the life of the patent. The negotiation condition requires that prior to 
the unauthorized use, the infringer negotiated for authorization on reasonable commercial 
terms and conditions and for a reasonable period of time. If this condition is strictly 
enforced, denials of injunctive relief will be available in cases only where the proposed 
user is aware of the patent it wishes to exploit. For example, Microsoft would not have 
been able to receive a compulsory license from z4 Technologies because Microsoft used 
the subject matter of z4‘s patents before it had notice that such subject matter was 
patented167—thus, a negotiation prior to use was impossible. However, if the spirit rather 
than the letter of the negotiation requirement is applied, courts will likely find pretrial 
negotiations as sufficient. 
 
 
VI. STRATEGIES TO BRING THE U.S. INTO COMPLIANCE 
 
If one concludes that the U.S. is in non-compliance with TRIPS, it may be 
possible to temper or ameliorate the situation before, as some commentators suggest, the 
TRIPS Dispute Settlement Body essentially sanctions a trade war.168  
One solution to non-compliance was suggested in Paice: a mandatory post-trial 
negotiation. 
 
In most cases, where the district court determines that a permanent 
injunction is not warranted, the district court may wish to allow the parties 
to negotiate a license amongst themselves regarding future use of a 
patented invention before imposing an ongoing royalty. Should the parties 
                                                 
163 Reichmann & Hasenzahl, supra note 77, at 14 (stating that the public interest is a ground 
separate from the category of abuse).  
164 TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 31(g). 
165 Id. art. 31(b). 
166 Id. art. 31(g). 
167 Z4 claimed Microsoft‘s Windows 2000 and Office 2001 products infringed their patents. z4 
Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex. 2006). However, Microsoft only 
became aware of z4‘s patents in April 2003. Defendant Microsoft Corporation‘s First Amended 
Answer and Counterclaims, z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex. 
2006), 2006 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings 335, 2. 
168 Dratler & McJohn, supra note 9, § 1A.01, at 1A-7. 




fail to come to an agreement, the district court could step in to assess a 
reasonable royalty in light of the ongoing infringement.169 
 
Judge Rader agreed with the Paice majority, but took a stronger position: ―this court 
should require the district court to remand this issue to the parties, or to obtain the 
permission of both parties before setting the ongoing royalty rate itself.‖170 Judge Rader 
continued:  
 
To avoid many of the disruptive implications of a royalty imposed as an 
alternative to the preferred remedy of exclusion, the trial court‘s discretion 
should not reach so far as to deny the parties a formal opportunity to set 
the terms of a royalty on their own. With such an opportunity in place, an 
ongoing royalty would be an ongoing royalty, not a compulsory license.171 
 
 A mandatory post-trial royalty negotiation would help mitigate TRIPS 
noncompliance because, if the parties reached a licensing arrangement on their own, 
Article 31 would not be implicated—the right holder would be authorizing the use. 
Moreover, a post-trial negotiation may more often result in an agreement than one before 
trial because one variable in the licensing calculus—patent validity—has been settled. 
 A second mitigating strategy would be to end the practice of submarine patents 
and more assiduously police prosecution laches. A submarine patent is the ―use of 
continuation applications to claim previously disclosed but unclaimed features of an 
invention many years after the filing of the original patent application.‖172 Limiting the 
number of continuations a patent applicant may file would provide better notice to the 
public in the course of a patent search. However, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia recently held in Tafas v. Dudas173 that such limits constituted 
substantive rulemaking and were consequently beyond the power of the U.S. Patent and 





Because TRIPS incorporates by reference the Paris Convention‘s compulsory 
licensing provisions, one may ask why international compliance is just now an issue. 
                                                 
169 Paice, L.L.C. v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1315 (2007). 
170 Id. at 1316 (Rader, J., concurring)  
171 Id. (emphasis added). 
172 Ricoh Co. v. Nashua Corp., No. 97-1344, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 2672, at *8 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 
Feb. 18, 1999). 
173 Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805 (E.D. Va. Apr. 1, 2008). 
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There are two reasons. First, under Continental Paper Bag,175 a non-working patentee 
who successfully pursued a patent infringement suit was normally awarded injunctive 
relief.176 Second, before the mandatory dispute settlement provision in TRIPS, the Paris 
Convention was largely unenforceable.177 
There are at least three ways to interpret compulsory licensing in TRIPS. First, the 
narrow view holds that Article 31 applies only to statutory schemes of compulsory 
licensing, as are common in Europe. Under this interpretation, judicial denials of 
injunctive relief stand outside Article 31‘s reach. In this case, only broad principles and 
objectives remain in assessing compliance. Second, an intermediate view holds that 
Article 31 controls except when its application leads to a result incongruous with the 
general principles and objectives of the Agreement—social and economic welfare, and a 
balance of rights and obligations, among others.178 When such a result might occur, 
courts likely have discretion to waive portions of the provision that cause the conflict. A 
third interpretation holds that Article 31 controls utterly with very little room for judicial 
discretion. This final interpretation is the least tenable. 
While cases post-eBay indicate that non-practicing entities and market 
competition weigh heavily in the analysis, these trends are arguably more artifacts of 
careful analysis than determinative. Post-eBay cases are careful to balance social and 
economic welfare and the rights and obligations of the patent holder. Such analysis is 
congruent with the objectives of TRIPS stated in Article 7. 
Thus, Article 31 is the primary provision on which compliance depends. Taking 
the narrow view on compulsory licensing—where Article 31 is inapplicable—courts 
applying eBay’s four-factor test will arrive at a result that almost certainly complies with 
TRIPS. Under the intermediate approach, some denials of injunctive relief under eBay 
may violate TRIPS, but in cases post-eBay this has not been the broad trend. Under the 
broadest approach, any denial of injunctive relief that permits ongoing infringement 
violates TRIPS unless the letter of Article 31 is met. Under this final approach, many 
denials of injunctive relief violate TRIPS because the infringers did not first negotiate 
with the right holder before exploiting the protected subject matter. 
However, these conclusions miss the practical point that the U.S. finds itself in a 
dilemma. If eBay is TRIPS compliant, developing countries can now cite the case as 
precedent for implementing their own compulsory licensing systems with their own 
notions of equity and the public interest.179 If eBay is not TRIPS compliant, 
commentators predict that the U.S. will be brought before the TRIPS Dispute Settlement 
Body, the result of which would be a loosening of TRIPS compulsory licensing 
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requirements or a re-tightening of the U.S. patent law injunctive relief.180 In the first 
scenario, one can imagine developing countries and the software and electronics 
industries being the beneficiaries, in the latter, developed countries and the 
pharmaceutical companies.181 Absent a Dispute Settlement Body panel report interpreting 
Article 31, the WTO should issue a ministerial declaration to clarify the meaning and 
scope of Article 31 as it did for public health in the Doha Declaration.  
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Determining TRIPS-Compliant Compulsory Licenses Under the Broadest Reading of 
Article 31 
 
